Transnational Ethnic Dimensions of Third-Party Interventions in Civil Wars*

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Abstract
Existing quantitative studies of transnational ethnic affinities and interstate conflict could benefit from greater systemacy when defining different forms of ethnic ties. This paper contributes towards this by presenting a typology of transnational ethnic affinities, defined by a dichotomous conception of whether ethnic groups have access to governmental power in their respective countries. Using the typology as a starting point, I derive hypotheses on the likelihood of third-party support for either government or rebels in civil wars. Empirical tests suggest that the typology of transnational ethnic affinities is a strong predictor of foreign support for civil war parties.

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TRANSNATIONAL ETHNIC AFFINITIES generate external support of ethnic groups in conflict. Transnational ethnic affinities raise the level of conflictual interaction between states. So one may summarise some of the recent findings in quantitative studies of transnational kin groups and political violence (Davis et al. 1997; Davis & Moore 1997; Gartzke & Gleditsch 2006; Saideman 2002). Whether it affects the level of militarised interstate disputes or the likelihood of outside support for beleaguered ethnic groups, the existence of transnational ethnic affinities serves with few exceptions (Gartzke & Gleditsch 2006) as a catalyst for conflict between states. In short, the quantitative literature provides ample support for the intuition that affective ties across state boundaries matter (Mitchell 1970; Suhrke & Noble 1977). What is thus far missing is analytical systemacy in deriving different forms of transnational ethnic affinities that are relevant for international relations. As a consequence, possible effects of certain types of ethnic ties across state boundaries are left untested.

This paper seeks to contribute towards greater systemacy. It does so by offering a simple typology of transnational ethnic affinities that springs deductively from two basic postulates: first, that the natural unit of analysis of relations between states is the pair of countries – the interstate dyad, and second, that politically relevant ethnic groups in any country can be classified as either 'ethnic groups in power' or 'marginalised ethnic groups' (Cederman & Girardin *forthcoming*). Using these two postulates as a starting point, I derive a typology of four interstate dyads defined by different patterns of transnational ethnic ties. For every type of dyad I infer empirical expectations for one particular form of conflictual interstate interaction, that of external interventions in ethnic civil wars. The resulting hypotheses concern not only the likelihood of intervention as such, but also how different forms of transnational ethnic affinities determine whether interventions in civil wars favour the government or rebel side.

The search for systemacy appears to bear fruits. Empirical tests using data on interventions in ethnic civil wars in Europe, Asia, and North Africa 1947-1992 (Lemke & Regan 2004) lends strong support to the empirical expectations. Transnational ethnic affinities cause interventions in civil wars. The interstate dyad typology of transnational ethnic ties predicts whether interventions will favour government or rebels. Furthermore, intervening states choose sides *primarily* as a function of transnational ethnic affinities. Mindful that the hypotheses are tested on data from a limited spatial and temporal domain, the typology still fares surprisingly well. The analyses not only elaborate on the meaning of transnational ethnic ties for international relations, they also testify to the value of analytical disaggregation when thinking about transnational ethnic affinities.

What is it about the politics of ethnicity across state boundaries? The next section develops a theoretical foundation for analysing transnational ethnic ties. Following that I introduce the typology of interstate dyads. Subsequent sections present the research design and the empirical analyses, before I conclude.

Transnational *ethnie*, transnational ethnic group

How is it possible that affective ties between ethnic groups across state boundaries can have material effects on the policies of their respective states? The obvious answer is that transnational ethnic communities do so when they are imbued with a particular political meaning. In order to understand the potential significance of politicised ethnicity I return to first principles by defining ethnic identity.

Fearon & Laitin (2000) provide a lucid definition of ethnic identity. Beginning from the premise that an 'identity' in generic terms is a social category, they argue that 'social categories are sets of people given a label … and distinguished by two main features: (1) rules of membership that decide who is and is not a member of the category; and (2) content, that is, sets of characteristics … thought to be typical of members of the category' (Fearon & Laitin 2000: 848). 'Ethnic identities', they note, 'are understood to be defined mainly by descent rules of group membership and content typically composed of cultural attributes, such as religion, language, customs, and shared historical myths' (Fearon & Laitin 2000: 848). By dividing the definition of ethnic identity into two components – 'rules of membership' and 'content' – the analyst is left with freedom to emphasise one or the other. I emphasise the meaning of rules of membership, particularly that of descent, and remain inclusive with regard to conceptions of content. Thus either religion, language, or other cultural traits may usefully denote ethnic communities in different places. The cultural content is of secondary concern. My primary interest is in the politics of genealogy. The concept of ethnic identity, therefore, is mainly associated with particular mechanisms of membership.

To make a statement about an ethnic identity, however, is not to make a claim about its political meaning. In order to link ethnic categories to political violence one has to either explain or assume the politicisation of ethnic categories, the circumstance in which ethnic identity is an organising principle in contentious politics. The extent to which ethnic categories have political meaning, the extent to which they are the 'focus and subject of political action and political community' (Smith 1986: 69), are historically and situationally contingent. Thus Kasfir (1979: 365), in a reflection over the fluid and intermittent nature of ethnic identities, argues that ethnic loyalties compete with other loyalties as the foundation of political action. It follows that ethnic identity not always is politicised. In Kasfir's terms, an

ethnic identity that becomes the foundation of political action is no longer the signifier of an ethnic *category*, it now denotes an ethnic *group* (Kasfir 1979: 373). Notwithstanding that the political relevance of ethnic groups is a fleeting matter, this paper is based on assumptions about the political meaning of transnational ethnic categories. A natural starting point is Smith's (1986) concept of the *ethnie*.

The *ethnie* is the apolitical, or prepolitical, culture-community. It is the ethnic *category* that has yet to become the 'focus and subject of political action and political community' (Smith 1986: 69). The *ethnie* is a set of individuals, a component of whose identity meet common rules of membership and conceptions of content (Fearon & Laitin 2000: 848), but that are not politically mobilised. The *transnational ethnie*, in turn, is by definition divided by a line in the form of an international border (Nye & Keohane 1970: xii). An *ethnie* may become transnational as colonial borders are drawn across ethno-cultural lines, by migration, or by the disintegration of states (Ganguly 1998: 9-10). For theoretical and operational purposes I *assume* that the transnational *ethnie* is politicised, that it constitutes a transnational ethnic group. I make the analytical move of 'reifying' the transnational ethnic group, meaning that I treat it as a 'given [entity] that [is] held constant throughout the analysis' (Cederman 2002: 412). Having assumed the politicised nature of transnational ethnic groups, and having reified them for purposes of analysis, I define transnational ethnic affinities as empathy and sympathy within transnational ethnic groups on issues for which ethnic identity is salient.

The power of transnational ethnic affinities to have material effects on the foreign policies of states derives from the power of ascription. By ascribing certain preferences or interests to their own ethnic identity, transnational ethnic groups can become tangible political actors. Similarly, when governments ascribe a particular political meaning to transnational ethnic groups, *perceptions* of transnational ethnic loyalties may be as powerful as *actual* cross-border ties. In short, it is not only possible, but expected that affective ties between ethnic groups across state boundaries have material effects on the policies of their respective states. To that testifies theoretical work such as Mitchell (1970) and Suhrke & Noble (1977), anecdotal studies by Cooper & Berdal (1993) and Heraclides (1990), comparative case studies such as Carment & James (2000) and Ganguly (1998), and quantitative work by Davis et al. (1997), Davis & Moore (1997), Gartzke & Gleditsch (2006), and Saideman (2002). In sum, transnational ethnic affinities have the power to cause foreign interventions in ethnic civil wars.

Interventions have been known to occur by a variety of mechanisms in which transnational ethnic ties are integral or complicit. Aside from the direct effects of appeals to

ethnic sympathies, it is worth highlighting the role of 'spillovers', the phenomena of diversionary wars and predatory states, the possible impact of irredenta and secessions, and the dynamic of ethnic outbidding.

First, spillovers may prompt neighbouring states to intervene in civil wars when fighting parties use their territories as battle fields, staging grounds, or for refuge (Lake & Rothchild 1998: 30). Ethnic groups that span bordering areas may facilitate such spillover, be it with or without the acquiescence of the intervening state. Flows of refugees across borders into kin territories may shift the ethnic balance and give rise to security concerns that draw neighbouring states into the conflict (Lake & Rothchild 1998; Lischer 2003; Salehyan & Gleditsch 2006).

Second, transnational ties with ethnic groups in conflict may serve as a pretext and focus for mobilisation behind diversionary or predatory wars (Lake & Rothchild 1998: 31). Political leaders may resort to adventurism in foreign policy in order to align political cleavages along transnational ethnic identities and thus demobilise opposition on alternative issues at home. Transnational ethnic ties may have the same mobilising potential for states with predatory intentions towards countries weakened by civil war.

Third, the transnational dimension of ethnic civil wars is closely linked with the phenomena of irredentism and secession (Lake & Rothchild 1998: 31). Ethnic civil wars are often secessionist conflicts – no surprise given that secession is 'an attempt by an ethnic group claiming a homeland to withdraw with its territory from the authority of a larger state of which it is a part' (Horowitz 1991: 9-10). Few states allow secessions to proceed unresisted. Foreign states may intervene in secessionist wars when they give rise to secessionist movements among their own ethnic groups. Alternatively, secessionist wars may feed the irredentist ambitions of intervening states as they seek to 'retrieve ethnically kindred people and their territory across borders' (Horowitz 1991: 10). Irredentas and secessions are closely connected (Horowitz 1991). The facilitating factor is transnational ethnic affinities.

Last, states that are potential interveners in civil wars and that have a dominant ethnic group with kin in conflict may experience that political parties, including the governing party, attempt to outbid each other with increasingly interventionist policies (Carment & James 2000: 183). As Lake & Rothchild (1996: 54) explain, political entrepreneurs may put pressure on the political community to adopt ethnic policies by using ethnicity as a 'key marker' in order to 'build constituencies for attaining or maintaining political power.' Moderate politicians may feel forced to adopt a stronger ethnically based position, engaging in a form of 'ethnic outbidding' (Lake & Rothchild 1996: 54). Ethnic policies become more

important, also in foreign affairs, and interventions in favour of ethnic kin become more likely.

Having introduced a particular concept of ethnicity, having established by assumption the political relevance of transnational ethnic groups, and having argued that affective ties can have material political effects, I now turn to the analytical disaggregation of transnational ethnic affinities. The following section begins with two basic postulates and goes on to derive a typology of kin dyads and attendant empirical expectations.

A typology of kin dyads

In their simplest form, unilateral interventions are dyadic events. One state acts within the boundaries of another. Intervention may be described as a function of relational characteristics. Accordingly, this paper uses the interstate dyad as its unit of analysis. The following section proposes a theoretical framework for the study of interstate effects of transnational relations between ethnic groups. My approach is deductive, and hinges on two conceptual choices: the interstate dyad as the unit of analysis, and the distinction between 'ethnic groups in power' and 'marginalised ethnic groups' (Cederman & Girardin *forthcoming*: 12).

Suppose that one deals with the generic dyad consisting of state *T* and state *I*, in which state *T* experiences internal conflict and is the potential target of intervention, and state *I* is the potential intervener. Suppose also that either state has one ethnic group in power (EGIP) and one or more marginalised ethnic groups (MEG). An ethnic group in power is a group whose 'leaders serve (at least intermittently) in senior governmental positions, especially within the cabinet. Beyond the ethnic background of a country's leading politicians, specific institutional arrangements, such as different types of power sharing and consociationalism, may also be indicators of power inclusion' (Cederman & Girardin *forthcoming*: 12). Marginalised ethnic groups is a residual category, and denotes exclusion from governmental power. I assume that the ethnic group in power in state *I* controls the means of coercion and is the potential executor of intervention. Then, *kin dyads* are defined as dyads in which there are transnational ethnic affinities between groups in both states. If one ethnic group in each state has ethnic affinity with one ethnic group in the other state, four possible dyadic configurations of ethnic groups and power emerge. These configurations constitute the kin dyad typology. I name every type of kin dyad by referring to the power status of the kin group in the potential intervener first, and then the power status of the kin group in the target state. Thus the EGIP-MEG dyad is a kin dyad in which the ethnic group in power in the potential intervener has affinity for a marginalised ethnic group involved in civil war. A

MEG-EGIP dyad is a kin dyad in which a marginalised ethnic group in the potential intervener has affinity for the ethnic group in power in the target state. The two remaining types of kin dyad are the EGIP-EGIP dyad and the MEG-MEG dyad, both of which have transnational ethnic affinities between groups with the same power status. Dyads are *ethnically neutral* if they contain no transnational ethnic affinities. The ethnically neutral dyad is the fifth type of dyad, and will serve as a reference category. I derive three hypotheses from the typology of kin dyads.

Hypothesis 1: **Intervention is more likely to occur in kin dyads than in ethnically neutral dyads, *ceteris paribus*.**

Kin dyads are pairs of states that are home to ethnic groups with affinity for each other. Such transnational ethnic bonds have international effects. A core hypothesis in this paper is that empathy and sympathy within transnational ethnic groups on issues for which ethnic identity is salient, may set in motion internal political processes that have external consequences. When ethnic kin is involved in civil war, transnational ethnic affinities are highly likely to give rise to material political opportunities or constraints. Any kin dyad is more likely to experience intervention than an ethnically neutral dyad. Whether intervening states choose to support the government or rebel side in civil wars depends on kin dyad type.

Hypothesis 2: **Interventions in the EGIP-MEG and MEG-EGIP dyads are most likely to favour the rebels in civil war, *ceteris paribus*.**

The empirical expectation for both the EGIP-MEG dyad and the MEG-EGIP dyad (Figures 1 and 2) is the same: interventions are expected to favour the rebels in the target state. The mechanisms by which intervention comes about, however, may be quite different, although they all involve the mobilisation of ethnic affinities.

The EGIP-MEG dyad provides perhaps the most intuitive case of affectively motivated intervention, and is analogous to the sort of dyad investigated by studies based on Minorities at Risk (Davis et al. 1997; Davis & Moore 1997; Saideman 2002). The intervener plays the role of a rescuer of beleaguered ethnic brethren, either in a real or rhetorical sense. By way of precedence, Saideman (2002: 32, 40) both argues and finds empirical evidence that a marginalised ethnic group in civil war is more likely to receive support, *ceteris paribus*, when its ethnic kin is in power in a neighbouring state. By assuming that 'politicians are





Figure 1: The EGIP-MEG dyad.



Figure 2: The MEG-EGIP dyad.

rational and that they care about gaining and holding office', that 'each politician requires the support of others to gain and maintain political office – the supporters forming the politician's constituency', and that ethnic identities influence the preferences of constituencies (Saideman 2002: 32), two expectations logically follow. First, a dominant ethnic constituency may pressure its elite to intervene in favour of its marginalised ethnic kin in conflict in another country, or second, an ethnic constituency may facilitate such intervention with more or less active acquiescence. The potential for bottom-up pressure and top-down mobilisation may be greater the more domestically predominant an ethnic group in power is (Carment & James 2000). The plight of kinsmen abroad may be a treasured cause for ethnic extremists and political entrepreneurs, who initiate and sustain cycles of 'ethnic outbidding' (Lake & Rothchild 1996: 53-54; Suhrke & Noble 1977: 12-13). Be it by push or by pull, ethnic affinities in EGIP-MEG dyads are likely to facilitate intervention in favour of the rebels.

One kin dyad conforming to the basic expectations of the EGIP-MEG dyad is Yugoslavia and Bosnia. The continued involvement of Serbian-dominated Yugoslavia in Bosnian civil violence 1992-1995, in support of conflict actors affiliated with the minority Bosnian Serbs, was attended by virulent ethicised rhetoric. The Serbian task, it was claimed,

was to defend their Bosnian Serb kin against the onslaughts of Muslim extremists (Gagnon 2004).

The MEG-EGIP dyad is a less intuitive case in which to link transnational ethnic affinities to intervention in civil war. The most plausible scenario may be the following. An offshoot of a civil war in state *T* is that its ethnic group in power embarks on an irredentist campaign. Given that a marginalised ethnic group that resides in state *I* shares ethnic identity with the group in power in *T*, the territorial integrity of *I* is threatened as a consequence of the irredentist policies of *T*. State *I* cannot remain indifferent to such a challenge. Among the ways in which *I* can neutralise the threat from state *T* is an intervention within *T* targeted against the group in power, designed to divert the resources of state *T* away from irredentism and to the campaign at home. Such a causal story is logically plausible, yet depends on a number of conditions suggesting that the MEG-EGIP dyad is a less likely case of intervention. It neatly illustrates, however, a point that will be made even more clear as I consider the MEG-MEG dyad below: transnational ethnic affinities may be involved in a causal process leading to intervention, even if the intervening ethnic group has no kinship ties, and intervenes for purely strategic reasons.

Hypothesis 3: **In the EGIP-EGIP and MEG-MEG dyads, interventions are most likely to favour the government in civil war, *ceteris paribus*.**

The EGIP-EGIP and MEG-MEG dyads are defined by the fact that transnational ethnic affinities run between groups with similar power status – two ethnic groups in power in the case of the EGIP-EGIP dyad (Fig. 3), and two marginalised ethnic groups in the case of the MEG-MEG dyad (Fig. 4). Ethnic affinities may cause intervention in each case, but yet again through quite different mechanisms.



Figure 3: The EGIP-EGIP dyad.



Figure 4: The MEG-MEG dyad

In the EGIP-EGIP dyad, similar mechanisms to those described for the EGIP-MEG dyad are expected to apply. The potential intervener may experience a push from its ethnic constituency to intervene in favour of kinsmen abroad, or its decision-makers may generate a pull by using ethnic issues to mobilise support for an intervention motivated by other concerns. In contrast to the EGIP-MEG dyad, the likelihood of intervention may be tempered by the fact that the ethnic kin in conflict in state *T* presumably is quite powerful, given that it typically controls the means of coercion. Still, rebel forces may be very effective battle ground actors, and state *I* may find itself compelled to intervene. The EGIP-EGIP dyad also has a strategic aspect. Although the affective bonds of kinship may not be enough to move the decision-makers in the potential intervener, the prospect of a fall from grace with its ethnic kin in civil war may be sufficient incentive to intervene.

An example of an EGIP-EGIP dyad may be found in Greece and Cyprus. In one of several instances, Greece intervened in favour of the majority Greek Cypriots in 1974, in the ethnic conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots (Cooper & Berdal 1993: 120).

The MEG-MEG dyad is, like the MEG-EGIP dyad, a case – and a much more plausible one – in which transnational ethnic affinities are part of a causal chain leading to intervention even though the intervener's ethnic group in power is not concerned. The dynamics of the MEG-MEG dyad are suggested by Suhrke & Noble (1977: 11), who deduce the possibility of governments cooperating (or for present purposes, one government intervening in favour of another) over similar ethnic problems, such as similar ethnic minorities seeking independence. Consider the scenario. State *T* experiences an internal conflict involving secessionist claims from a marginalised ethnic group. The secessionist group may be part of a 'stateless nation' divided into ethnic minorities by several countries, whose territorial integrity is threatened by the stateless nation's actual or potential irredentist claims. For example, such a dynamic is present in the Kurdish minorities' relations with their host states. A secessionist conflict in state *T*, particularly one that threatens to be successful for the rebel group, is evidently then a material threat to the cohesion of state *I*, whose elite, whatever ethnicity, has strong incentives to intervene in favour of the ethnic group in power in state *T*. Such incentives may in part have motivated India when it in 1987 intervened in favour of the status quo, and by implication the government in Sri Lanka (Cooper & Berdal 1993: 123-124; Ganguly 1998). India could not let the Tamil separatists in Sri Lanka successfully secede due to concern for secessionist ambitions in its own Tamil minority. In short, transnational ethnic affinities in the MEG-MEG dyad may create security threats for the potential intervener, great enough to warrant intervention.

Data

The kin dyad typology is tested using data on interventions in civil wars from Regan (1996), as adapted by Lemke & Regan (2004). To that I have added ethnicity variables, as well as data on capabilities and geographical proximity. I adopt Lemke & Regan's (2004: 155) data design, whose unit of analysis is the civil war dyad. Each country with civil war paired with each other country in the international system is thus taken as one observation, irrespective of how long the internal conflict has lasted, or whether it is ongoing. Regan (2000: 21) defines civil war as 'armed combat between groups within state boundaries in which there are at least 200 fatalities'. The definition is intended to capture the seriousness of a conflict, yet to exclude events like 'bloodless' coups, riots or demonstrations. The original dataset includes all civil wars that began between 1944 and 1994, beginning with the Greek civil war, 1944 - 1949, and ending with the conflict over Chechnya, 1994 and ongoing (Regan 2000: 153-158). As I will explain, I analyse a subset of Regan's data. Below, I present the dependent variables, the ethnicity variables, and the control variables in turn.

Dependent variables

As indicated by the set of hypotheses, two dependent variables are to be analysed: the *occurrence* of intervention and the *side* of intervention.

Intervention

Conceptually, interventions are cases in which states mobilise significant resources in order to influence the course and outcome of civil wars (Regan 2000: 9). Indeed, much of my discussion has been devoted to specifying circumstances under which states would be willing to mobilise such resources. The operational art is in distinguishing cases of real intervention from mere attempts at influence. The decisive two criteria are that interventions break with the conventions of international relations, and that they are designed to change or preserve the authority structures in the target state (Regan 2000: 9). Accordingly, Regan (2000: 10) register as interventions in civil wars 'convention-breaking military and/or economic activities in the internal affairs of a foreign country targeted at the authority structures of the government and opposition forces.' 'Intervention' is a dichotomous variable in the Lemke & Regan dataset, indicating whether *I* intervened in *T* within a civil war dyad.

Intervention side

For the purpose of indicating intervention side, the Lemke & Regan dataset contains two dummy variables, one indicating whether interventions favoured the government, the other whether interventions favoured the opposition.

Independent variables

When explaining the incidence and side of interventions, the preoccupation here, of course, is with the possible effects of various configurations of ethnicity. The set of hypotheses suggests that two central dimensions be measured: the existence of transnational ethnic affinities, and the type of dyad if such affinities are present.

Kin dyad

Kin dyad is a dichotomous variable indicating whether any ethnic group in the potential intervener has affinity with an ethnic group in conflict in the target state. The model of interventions in ethnic civil wars is highly actor-based. States are expected to intervene in favour of either government or rebels based on how their ethnic groups are affiliated with particular conflict actors, and whether those conflict actors represent ethnic groups in power or marginalised ethnic groups. Therefore, the variable *kin dyad* also has to be actor-based. In order to construct the *kin dyad* variable, then, the following steps must be taken:

1) Identify a set of civil wars in which parties are organised along ethnic cleavages;
2) Identify the armed organisations that are active in those civil wars, including the incumbent government;
3) Determine which ethnic groups provide the main constituency for the conflict actors, or the ethnic groups to which the actors have their main affiliation;
4) Determine the set of other countries – if any – that have ethnic groups with affinity for any of the conflict actors.

As an operational approximation of these steps, I used the following procedure. First, I selected all civil wars in the Lemke & Regan (2004) dataset that are classified as either ethnic or religious. The religious conflicts were included because, according to my conceptualisation of ethnicity, it is not always clear what the difference is between an ethnic and a religious conflict. Given that I define ethnicity with an emphasis on the *rules of membership*, the primary of which is descent, and given that I remain relatively inclusive as regards the *content* of ethnic identity, and that religious affiliation may provide such content, then it is natural to conceive of some civil wars along sectarian lines as ethnic. Some of the most pertinent examples from the present data include the Iraqi Shi'i uprising against the

Sunni power holders following the 1991 Gulf War, as well as recurring sectarian violence in Lebanon since 1958. These are communal conflicts where sectarian belonging is the primary political cleavage, and a function of descent, not conversion. Such civil wars were therefore included in the set of ethnic conflicts. Lemke & Regan's (2004) classification of ethnic and religious conflicts is based on work done by Regan (1996), where he identifies the type of conflict based on the 'orientation of the primary groups involved in the fighting' (Regan 1996: 342). Regan uses as sources the Minorities at Risk classification scheme (Gurr 1993), and the Correlates of War cultural dataset (Singer 1996).

Second, I identified the armed organisations that were active in these civil wars by referring to the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Database, version 3 (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Strand et al. 2005). This was necessary because Regan's (1996) list of civil wars is not actor-based. It merely lists the countries experiencing civil war. By using the countries in civil war identified by Regan as a starting point, along with the calendar years in which Regan deems the conflicts to have started and ended, I identified the intrastate conflict actors that were active in each conflict country and each conflict period in whole or in part, by cross-referencing Regan's (1996) conflict list with the Uppsala/PRIO main conflict table. I have thereby included all conflict actors internal to the state in 'armed conflict', defined as 'a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths' (Strand et al. 2005: 3). The Uppsala/PRIO main conflict table provides the names of all conflict parties included according to its operational definition and coding criteria (see Strand et al. 2005). Thus I assembled a list of all non-state armed organisations as well as the governments that were active in a set of civil wars considered to be organised along ethnic cleavages.

Third, I determined the ethnic groups that provide the main constituency for the conflict actors, or the ethnic groups to which the actors have their main affiliation[1]. This was done with reference to a variety of written and worldwide web-based sources[2]. The criterion

[1] I was greatly aided in this regard by preliminary coding work by Erika Forsberg of the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University.

[2] Written sources: Dunbabin, J. P. D. (1994). *The Post-Imperial Age. The Great Powers and the Wider World.* Harlow: Addison Wesley Longman Limited; Goldschmidt Jr., Arthur (1999). *A Consise History of the Middle East.* Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press; Khalaf, Samir (2002). *Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon. A History of the Internationalisation of Communal Conflict.* New York: Columbia University Press; Minority Rights Group (1997). *World Directory of Minorities*. London: Minority Rights Group International; Nietschmann, Bernard (1986). 'Bangladesh Imperialism', *New York Times*, October 25; O'balance, Edgar (1998). *Civil War in Lebanon, 1975-92.* London: Macmillan Press Ltd.; Szajkowski, Bogdan, Ed. (2004). *Revolutionary and Dissident Movements of the World*. London: John Harper Publishing. Worldwide web-based sources: Federation of American Scientists Intelligence Resource

for inclusion on the list of ethnic groups in conflict was that a group appears in Fearon's (2003) list of ethnic groups by country. This was necessary because the coding of *kin dyad* requires a list of ethnic groups by country that includes groups according to a consistent set of criteria. Notably, Fearon's (2003: 195) list only includes groups that are estimated to amount to 1 percent or more of a country's population in the 1990s. This means that some ethnic wars are missing from the final dataset, even if the ethnic identity of the fighting parties may easily be ascertained. The territorial conflict between the Indian government and the Naga Underground Rebels (NNC) 1954-1964, for example, is not included in the final dataset because the Naga constitute less than 1 percent of the Indian population. The Naga therefore do not appear in Fearon's list of ethnic groups. In the case of the NNC, as well as other rebel organisations that represent tiny ethnic minorities, it is not possible to use Fearon's list to determine whether they appear in other countries. Civil wars involving ethnic groups absent from Fearon's list are therefore dropped from the analysis.

Finally, for every civil war I determined the set of other countries – if any – that have ethnic groups with affinity for any of the conflict actors, by cross-referencing the ethnic groups in conflict with Fearon's (2003) list of ethnic groups in all other countries. Any potential intervener being home to the same ethnic group as a conflict actor in the target state was coded as constituting a kin dyad. Given that Fearon is not entirely consistent when allotting names to ethnic groups, this step in the coding of kin dyads did at times require some subjective adaptation. The United Kingdom, for example, was coded as being in a kin dyad with India in its conflict with Sikh insurgents 1985-onwards, knowing that the United Kingdom is home to a sizeable minority of Indians, even if Fearon only lists 'Asians' as one of its minorities. Some subjective adaptation was also applied in a few other cases, notably when coding kin dyads in the Middle East. A table presenting these and other coding decisions is provided in Appendix 1. Having coded *kin dyad* in an actor-based framework, I then turned to the task of coding the kin dyad types.

Kin dyad type

My central argument is that one may explain the side of interventions by differentiating between different types of kin dyads. In order to categorise the kin dyads according to configurations of ethnic groups and power, I rely on Cederman & Girardin's (*forthcoming*) identification of ethnic groups in power (EGIP) and marginalised ethnic groups (MEG), based on Fearon's (2003) list of ethnic groups. The variable *Kin dyad type* is structured as a

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Program (http://fas.org/irp/world/para/); OnWar.com (http://www.onwar.com); UCDP conflict summaries (http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/index.php); Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/).

subset of four dichotomous variables, each indicating whether a kin dyad is an *EGIP-MEG*, *MEG-EGIP*, *EGIP-EGIP*, or a *MEG-MEG dyad*. The reference category, that is when all four dummy variables have the value 'zero', is the dyad with no transnational ethnic affinities – the ethnically neutral dyad.

Kin dyad type was coded by noting whether a conflict actor's kin group in a potential intervener was an ethnic group in power or a marginalised ethnic group, and then comparing its power status with that of the conflict actor. In accordance with the kin dyad typology, cases in which the predominant ethnic ties were between an ethnic group in power in the potential intervener and a marginalised ethnic conflict actor were coded as EGIP-MEG dyads, and cases in which a marginalised ethnic group in the potential intervener had ties with an ethnic group in power in the conflict-ridden country were coded as MEG-EGIP dyads. Similarly, kin dyads were coded as EGIP-EGIP when the predominant ethnic ties were between ethnic groups in power in both intervener and target state, and kin dyads were coded as MEG-MEG when the most important ethnic ties were between marginalised ethnic groups in both states.

The reliance on Cederman & Girardin's (*forthcoming*) coding of EGIP for determining kin dyad types imposes certain spatial limitations on the dataset. The coding of EGIP is at present limited to Europe, Asia, and North Africa. The Americas, Oceania, and sub-Saharan Africa are excluded. Lemke & Regan's (2004) dataset of 12,310 ethnic and religious civil war dyads is thus reduced to 2,577 dyads. From having encompassed 82 civil conflicts and 99 interventions, the corresponding frequencies are now 40 and 38. These numbers are further decreased as some conflicts are dropped due to insufficient data on ethnic groups, or due to the fact that some sectarian conflicts cannot be classified as ethnic. Table 1 summarises some descriptive statistics on the final dataset.

Supplementary variables

Interventions have been modelled with various sets of variables (see Aydin 2005: 23; Lemke & Regan 2004: 161; Pickering 2002: 308-309; Regan 1998: 772), and with varying emphases. My emphasis is obviously on ethnicity variables, yet I supplement them with variables that are central in a causal story, control variables intended to minimise correlation between residuals and independent variables, and variables found to have significant effects by Regan (1998), Pickering (2002), and Lemke & Regan (2004).

Table 1: Summary statistics on the dataset, absolute frequencies.

Dyadic statistics	Dyads	1773
	Kin dyads	136
	EGIP-MEG dyads	14
	MEG-EGIP dyads	47
	EGIP-EGIP dyads	37
	MEG-MEG dyads	38
Conflict statistics	Conflicts	27
	Conflicts with interventions	20
	Interventions	32
	Min. interventions per conflict	0
	Max. interventions per conflict	3

Power asymmetry is not included by any of the intervention studies referred to above, but a formal model of the choice to intervene developed in Austvoll (2005: 17-27) suggests that power asymmetry is a central correlate of intervention. Generally, the likelihood of intervention should be a positive function of the power of *I* because the capabilities of a potential intervener indicate its ability to project power (Boulding 1962/1988: 231). The likelihood of intervention should be a negative function of the power of *T* because interventions in relatively more powerful states are expected to be more costly, *ceteris paribus*. The estimated probability of successful intervention should be greater the more power-preponderant *I* is. Hence, the probability of intervention should be positively related to $\frac{capabilities_I}{capabilities_T}$. I measure power asymmetry as the natural log of the ratio of CINC-scores, lagged by one year prior to the outbreak of civil war. The CINC-scores are taken from the Correlates of War 'Composite Index of National Capability', version 3.02 (Singer 1987; Singer et al. 1972).

The capabilities of the potential intervener. It is necessary to control for the size of the potential intervener in order to minimise omitted variable bias in the effect of power ratio. Hegre (2005: 14) demonstrates how severe such bias may be. In the context of interventions, power asymmetry as measured by power ratio must be controlled for the capabilities of *I* in order to exclude the suggestion that great powers would seize any opportunity to intervene in small countries. By holding the capabilities of the potential intervener constant, the

remaining effect of power asymmetry is more due to variation in the size of the target state. I apply the natural log of the potential interveners' CINC-scores, lagged.

Joint borders and ***distance*** are necessary control variables for *kin dyad.* A major proportion of any variance in *kin dyad* is likely to be accounted for by contiguity and proximity. Adjacent states are more likely to include the same ethnic group. Similarly, the density and reach of diasporas should roughly be a negative function of distance. The further states are from each other, the less likely they are kin countries. Apart from their importance as control variables, both contiguity and distance are well established correlates of interstate interaction, war, and intervention (Boulding 1962/1988: 230; Buhaug & Gleditsch 2005; Clark & Regan 2003: 100; Diehl 1991: 20; Gleditsch & Singer 1974: 483-484; Regan 1998: 772; Starr & Most 1978: 451). *Joint borders* is a dummy variable indicating whether states are contiguous by land or not (Lemke & Regan 2004: 155). *Distance* is measured as the natural log of the distance between the capital cities of *T* and *I*. Data on distance was compiled as described by Gleditsch (1995: 305).

The full model of intervention considered here also includes ***conflict intensity***, measured by number of casualties per year (Lemke & Regan 2004: 154), and log-transformed; ***alliance*** – a dummy indicating whether *T* and *I* have entered a treaty that 'would qualify it as a defense pact, neutrality or non-aggression pact, or an entente' (Gibler & Sarkees 2004: 214; Lemke & Regan 2004: 155); ***colonial history*** – a dummy indicating whether *I* was a previous coloniser of *T* or not. The variable is coded zero for all dyads in which *T* never was a colony (Lemke & Regan 2004: 156); ***Cold War –*** a dummy coded '1' for all conflicts before 1 January 1989 and '0' for all subsequent conflicts (Lemke & Regan 2004: 154).

Findings

The findings from the statistical analysis conform very closely to the expectations derived from the kin dyad typology. By assuming that ethnic groups may be classified by whether they have governmental power or whether they are marginalised in domestic politics, and by choosing the interstate dyad as the natural unit of analysis of external interventions in internal wars, I inferred that transnational ethnic affinities may be classified according to four structural power configurations. By deducing how a potential intervener should be expected to behave within each of the four kin dyad types, I formulated a simple set of hypotheses: kin countries should be more likely to intervene in civil wars than countries with no ethnic affinity for a conflict actor. More specifically, potential interveners whose ethnic group in power has affinity for a marginalised ethnic group in conflict should be most likely

to intervene in favour of the rebels, as should countries whose marginalised ethnic group has affinity with an ethnic group in power involved in civil war, although the latter case is less clear. Finally, potential interveners whose ethnic group in power has kin in power in a conflict country, and potential interveners containing a marginalised ethnic group with marginalised kin in conflict in the target state, should both be most likely to intervene on the government side in civil war.

I will demonstrate that these expectations are largely supported by the results. The findings also illustrate a related, but separate point. Transnational ethnic affinities cause interventions. However, in order to see how transnational ethnic affinities do cause interventions, it is necessary to align the empirical story to the theoretical story by sufficiently disaggregating both independent and dependent variable. I will make this argument by presenting three analyses that sequentially disaggregate the explanatory and outcome variables. I will first investigate the effect of *kin dyad* on *intervention*. I will then go on to disaggregate *kin dyad* by presenting an analysis of the effect of *kin dyad type* on *intervention*. By making a final disaggregation – that of splitting *intervention* into a dependent variable indicating *intervention side* – I will analyse the effect of *kin dyad type* on *intervention side*, and argue that such a level of disaggregation is necessary in order to understand the effect of transnational ethnic affinities on the likelihood of third-party interventions in civil wars.

Analysis 1: the effect of 'kin dyad' on 'intervention'

As a starting point, table 2 illustrates the bivariate effect of *kin dyad* on *intervention* by reporting the absolute and relative frequency distributions of *kin dyad* on *intervention*.

Table 2: Frequency distribution of *kin dyad* on *intervention*, absolute and relative frequencies (%).

Kin dyad / *Intervention*	Yes	No	N
Yes	21 (15)	11 (0.7)	32
No	115 (85)	1626 (99.3)	1741
N	136 (100)	1637 (100)	4335

Chi-squared (df = 1) = 154.548, p < 0.0005

According to the contingency table, the odds of an intervention occurring within a kin dyad is 0.18, whereas the odds of an ethnically neutral dyad experiencing intervention is a mere

0.0067. That is, the odds of an intervention occurring when transnational ethnic affinities are present are about 27 times higher than when ethnic ties are absent. The positive effect of *kin dyad* on the likelihood of intervention is sizeable. The chi-squared statistic for the table, with $p < 0.0005$, indicates that the correlation is highly significant. It remains to be seen, however, whether any effect of *kin dyad* remains when the most important control variables are introduced.

Table 3 reports the coefficient estimates from binomial logistic regressions with the binary variable *intervention* as the dependent variable. The coefficient estimates, β_i, express linear change in the natural log of the odds of intervention, $\ln\left(\frac{p}{1-p}\right)$. Positive estimates thus represent positive effects on the probability of intervention, whereas negative estimates represent the converse. The coefficients may easily be converted into odds ratios, defined as e^{β_i}. The odds ratio indicates the relative change in the odds of intervention resulting from a one-unit increase in the explanatory variable, all else being constant. Inference from the models in table 3 and all subsequent regressions are based on robust standard errors, clustered by civil war[3].

Model 1 replicates the bivariate relationship between *kin dyad* and *intervention* reported in table 2. The odds ratio is $e^{3.296} \approx 27$, precisely as seen in the contingency table. It would seem that interventions are much more likely to occur in kin dyads than in ethnically neutral dyads. As it stands, however, the variable *kin dyad* may only represent the fact that interveners and target states are likely to be contiguous or geographically proximate. In order to control for the effects of such confounding variables, model 2 includes *joint borders* and the natural log of *distance*. As expected, both variables have significant effects. Potential interveners are more likely to meddle in civil wars that occur next door or within a shorter radius than in civil wars that are further afield. Having controlled for contiguity and distance, however, *kin dyad* still has a positive and significant, albeit reduced effect. Its coefficient now converts to an odds ratio of about 5. The odds of a kin state intervening in a

[3] The estimation of parameters and standard errors in logistical regression is based on binomial or multinomial sampling models that assume independence between units of observation (Helland 1999: 23; Agresti 1996: 7-8). The present dataset may violate this assumption. As indicated in table 1, more than one intervention occurred in several civil wars. The decision by one state to intervene most likely influences the choices of other states. Hence, both interventions and non-interventions within the same conflict must be expected to depend on each other. I compensate for this by using the Huber-White estimator of variance, often referred to as a robust estimator of variance (StataCorp 2005c: 275). I cluster the estimation of robust standard errors by civil conflict, based on the assumption that each conflict gives rise to a unique set of contingencies so that interventions or non-interventions in different conflicts may be treated as independent of each other.

civil war is five times greater than the odds of intervention by a non-kin state, controlling for *joint borders* and *distance*.

Table 3: Logistic regression estimates, probability of interventions in civil wars.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
	$\hat{\beta}$ (SE)	$\hat{\beta}$ (SE)	$\hat{\beta}$ (SE)	$\hat{\beta}$ (SE)	$\hat{\beta}$ (SE)
Kin dyad	3.296*** (0.373)	1.568*** (0.662)	1.836** (0.811)	1.952** (0.829)	1.239 (0.871)
Joint borders		1.287** (0.633)	1.125* (0.636)	1.231** (0.568)	1.371* (0.707)
ln *Distance*		-0.834*** (0.249)	-0.967*** (0.295)	-0.970*** (0.297)	-1.003*** (0.315)
ln *Power ratio*			0.352* (0.185)	0.327* (0.183)	0.257 (0.171)
ln *Capabilities*$_I$			0.353* (0.198)	0.337* (0.200)	0.329 (0.213)
ln *Conflict intensity*				-0.079 (0.089)	
Allied				0.487 (0.586)	
Colonial history					2.110*** (0.552)
Cold War					1.177*** (0.442)
Constant	-4.996*** (0.272)	-1.557 (1.814)	3.913 (3.014)	4.612 (2.912)	3.134 (3.373)
N	1773	1773	1722	1657	1722
Log pseudo-likelihood	-124.512	-109.681	-92.974	-92.169	-86.081
Pseudo R^2	0.223	0.315	0.368	0.369	0.415
*: p < 0.10, **: p < 0.05, ***: p < 0.01 (robust standard errors, clustered by civil war).					

As successive pairs of control variables are added in models 3 and 4, little substantial change is observed in the prior set of variables, indicating that the additional variables, to the extent that they correlate with the likelihood of intervention, do so relatively independently of the other variables. Model 3 introduces the power ratio between potential intervener and target state to the equation, as well as a measure of the capabilities of *I*. As expected, both are significant and positively related to the likelihood of intervention. Power-preponderant states, and states with greater absolute capabilities, are more likely to intervene than weaker states. Model 4 introduces a measure of the intensity of the civil war, and a dummy variable indicating whether the potential intervener is an ally of the target state. In contrast to Regan (1998: 772) and Lemke & Regan (2004: 161), *conflict intensity* and *alliance* have non-significant effects. It would seem that interventions in ethnic civil wars within Eurasia and North Africa occur irrespective of civil war casualty rates, or alliance ties between intervener and target. As indicated by the pseudo R^2, furthermore, the variables add no explanatory power to the model. *Conflict intensity* and *alliance* are accordingly dropped from the remaining analyses.

Lastly, model 5 adds a dummy variable indicating whether the potential intervener is a former coloniser of the target state, and an indicator of whether the civil war occurred during the Cold War. Both variables have as expected positive and significant effects. Former imperial powers are more likely to meddle in the affairs of old vassals than states with no colonial history. Interventions were a more favoured instrument of foreign policy during the Cold War than during the brief span of the 1990s covered by the present data. Two changes should be noted as *colonial history* and *Cold War* are introduced. First, the positive effects of *power ratio* and *capabilities* are no longer significant. This may be explained by the fact that former imperial powers often are great powers, or at least more powerful than their past colonies. The variable *colonial history* should therefore contain some of the information previously represented by *power ratio* and *capabilities*.

Second, and more interesting for my purposes, the positive effect of *kin dyad* is rendered non-significant. Does this mean that transnational ethnic affinities do not matter? There are several ways of interpreting the change in *kin dyad*. One interpretation is that some of the variance previously explained by *kin dyad* now is explained by *colonial history*. Colonisers have often become kin states to their former colonies due to colonisation by settlement, or migration from colonial peripheries to their imperial centre. Interventions by Turkey in Cyprus and by the former USSR in Georgia and Moldova, for example, were not only interventions by kin states, but also the involvement of former imperial powers. When accounting for the interstate politics of a colonial history, it would seem that transnational ethnic affinities no longer have an effect.

An alternative interpretation of the change in *kin dyad*, however, is that the *kin dyad* variable represents an aggregate of so many different contingencies of ethnic affinities that it masks the effects of certain types of kin dyad. In order to investigate this possibility, I disaggregate *kin dyad* into the respective types if kin dyad, and turn to an analysis of the effects of *kin dyad type* on the probability of intervention.

Analysis 2: the effect of 'kin dyad type' on 'intervention'

Table 4 reports the coefficient estimates from a logistic regression of the binary dependent variable *intervention*. Model 6 differs from model 5 only by the fact that the variable *kin dyad* is disaggregated into its respective dyad types. The control variables are identical to those in model 5, and for substantive purposes, they perform in model 6 as they did in model 5.

Table 4: Logistic regression estimates, probability of interventions in civil wars.

	Model 6	
	$\hat{\beta}$	(SE)
EGIP-MEG dyad	3.009***	(0.816)
MEG-EGIP dyad	-0.086	(1.091)
EGIP-EGIP dyad	1.524	(1.439)
MEG-MEG dyad	0.754	(1.105)
Joint borders	1.709**	(0.842)
ln *Distance*	-0.952**	(0.368)
ln *Power ratio*	0.271	(0.170)
ln *Capabilities*$_I$	0.288	(0.211)
Colonial history	2.243***	(0.639)
Cold War	1.236***	(0.435)
Constant	2.412	(3.520)
N	1722	
Log pseudo-likelihood	-81.498	
Pseudo R^2	0.446	
*: p < 0.10, **: p < 0.05, ***: p < 0.01 (robust standard errors, clustered by civil war).		

The estimated effects of the respective types of kin dyad on the likelihood of intervention are notable primarily for two reasons. First, the effect of the EGIP-MEG dyad is sizeable, positive and significant. Countries whose ethnic group in power has affinity for a marginalised ethnic group in civil war are much more likely to intervene than countries with no ethnic affinities. The substantive implications are not surprising, and they are analogous to the stories told by Davis et al. (1997), Davis & Moore (1997), and Saideman (2002): conflictual interaction between two states, be it in the form of war or intervention, is more likely when a beleaguered ethnic minority in one state has ethnic kin in power in another. The fact that the effect of the EGIP-MEG dyad emerges so clearly in model 6 testifies to the value of analytical disaggregation. While transnational ethnic affinities seemed to lose their explanatory relevance in the first set of analyses, it would seem that the variable *kin dyad* subsumed so many kin dyad types that it masked the substantial effect of the EGIP-MEG dyad. Affective ties between ethnic groups now do seem to matter.

The coefficient estimates in model 6 are also notable for the fact that no other kin dyad type has a significant effect on the likelihood of intervention. Ostensibly, these findings run contrary to the central empirical expectation that transnational ethnic affinities cause interventions in civil war under a variety of power configurations. If the non-significant effects of the MEG-EGIP, EGIP-EGIP and MEG-MEG dyads are to be taken at face value, then it would mean that previous studies on the effects of transnational ethnic affinities are quite sufficient. A saturated typology of kin dyads is of no use. Only the EGIP-MEG dyad

matters. Ethnic groups in power intervene where marginalised kin groups are embroiled in civil war.

An alternative interpretation of the poor performance of the kin dyad typology in model 6 is that the model, like model 5, still suffers from overaggregation. The empirical expectations inferred from each type of kin dyad concerned not only the likelihood of intervention as such, but also the probability that the intervener enter a civil war by supporting either government or rebels. Indeed, the hypotheses were formulated explicitly with regard to the expected *side* of interventions. Given that the dependent variable in model 6 is a binary variable that only indicates whether an intervention occurred or not, the possibility remains that the effects of certain kin dyad types are neutralised because they contain conflicting tendencies with regard to the side of interventions. In order to pursue this possibility, I turn to a third set of analyses.

Analysis 3: the effect of 'kin dyad type' on 'intervention side'

It may be re-emphasised that the hypotheses suggest it is necessary to operationally distinguish between interventions in favour of the government side in civil war and interventions in support of the rebels. Recall that analyses of the EGIP-MEG dyad and the MEG-EGIP dyad generated the expectation that transnational ethnic affinities would cause interventions in favour of the rebels, whereas interventions in favour of the government were expected in the EGIP-EGIP and MEG-MEG dyads. In order to test the hypotheses on intervention side, and thereby operationalise a final analytical disaggregation, I split the binary variable *intervention* into the trinary variable *intervention side*, indicating if an intervention took place in support of the government, opposition, or not at all.

The dependent variable *intervention side* is a categorical variable with three values. Binomial logistic regression is therefore no longer appropriate. Instead I apply multinomial logistic regression. Multinomial logit models estimate linear effects on the log odds of outcomes relative to some reference category when the dependent variable is nominal and has more than two values. The reference category here is *no intervention*. The coefficient estimates therefore indicate changes in the likelihood of either intervention in support of the government or intervention in favour of the rebels, relative to no intervention occurring at all.

A complicating factor when applying multinomial logistic regression is that it multiplies the number of parameter estimates. Given that there now are two different intervention outcomes, every variable will be assigned two beta estimates, one for intervention in favour of the government, and one for intervention supporting the rebels. In

a sample such as this, where the number of interventions is as low as 31[4], a high number of parameter estimates will create problems of overdetermination. In order to avoid the problem of overdetermination, it is necessary to keep the model as parsimonious as possible. In effect, the number of parameter estimates must be limited, at the same time as the hypotheses on intervention side are tested. One may attain this by estimating the model under a number of constraints.

Table 5 reports the coefficient estimates from two multinomial logistic regressions with *intervention side* as the dependent variable. In both regressions, the MLE iterative process maximizes a multinomial logit model for which I have defined a set of constraints in order to reduce the number of parameters[5]. The multinomial models consists of two equations referred to as G (government) and R (rebels) that include the same parameters β_1, β_2 ,... β_{k-1} , β_k .

In Model 7, I have constrained the parameters to be identical in both equations, $\beta_{Gi} = \beta_{Ri}$. This model is practically the same as model 6. While the coefficient estimates are marginally different from those in model 6, they are for substantive purposes identical. The EGIP-MEG dyad is the only type of kin dyad with a significant effect. The control variables perform precisely as before.

With model 7 as a starting point, model 8 relaxes some of the constraints on the multinomial coefficient estimates in order to test the effects of *kin dyad type* on *intervention side*. Sparseness is an ideal when relaxing the constraints, given that the number of interventions in the data is low. First, I have altered the constraints on *kin dyad type* in model 8 according to the hypotheses derived from the kin dyad typology:

1) EGIP-MEG dyads are expected to cause interventions in favour of the rebels. States whose ethnic group in power has affinity with a marginalised ethnic group involved in civil war are likely to intervene in favour of its kin, and unlikely to intervene in favour of the government with which its kin is in conflict. If the EGIP-MEG dyad has a positive effect on the probability of intervention in favour of the rebels, then the likelihood of support for the government should be its inverse. The coefficient estimate for *EGIP-MEG dyad*'s

[4] The number of interventions analysed in the multinomial regressions is 1 less than the number of interventions included in the prior analyses. This is due to the fact that one of the interventions included in my subset of Regan's (1996) data is coded as neutral – the United Kingdom's intervention in Cyprus during the civil conflict 1963-1964. It was therefore dropped from the multinomial analyses.
[5] The constraints were defined in Stata using the 'constraint' command (StataCorp 2005a: 258-260), and applied to the multinomial logistic regression using the 'constraints(*clist*)' option (StataCorp 2005b: 215-217).

effect on *intervention in favour of government* is therefore constrained to be the negative of any effect of *EGIP-MEG dyad* on *intervention in favour of rebels*.

2) MEG-EGIP dyads, although conceivably causing interventions in favour of the rebels, are, as it was put earlier in this paper, less likely cases of intervention. The estimated effect of *MEG-EGIP dyad* on *intervention in favour of rebels* is therefore allowed to be determined without constraints, whereas the parameter for *intervention in favour of government* is constrained to be zero.

Table 5: Multinomial logistic regression estimates, probability of interventions in civil wars in support of either government or rebels (constrained).

	Model 7			**Model 8**		
	G *Intervention in favour of government*	**R** *Intervention in favour of rebels*	Test for $\beta_{Gi} = \beta_{Ri}$	**G** *Intervention in favour of government*	**R** *Intervention in favour of rebels*	Test for $\beta_{Gi} = \beta_{Ri}$
	$\hat{\beta}$ (SE)	$\hat{\beta}$ (SE)	χ^2 (sig.)	$\hat{\beta}$ (SE)	$\hat{\beta}$ (SE)	χ^2 (sig.)
EGIP-MEG dyad	3.042*** (0.833)	3.042*** (0.833)		-3.286*** (0.808)	3.286*** (0.808)	16.53 (< 0.00005)***
MEG-EGIP dyad	0.047 (1.093)	0.047 (1.093)		dropped	-0.523 (1.016)	0.26 (0.607)
EGIP-EGIP dyad	1.580 (1.448)	1.580 (1.448)		3.682** (1.603)	-0.414 (0.943)	5.57 (0.018)**
MEG-MEG dyad	0.853 (1.071)	0.853 (1.071)		3.682** (1.603)	-0.414 (0.943)	5.57 (0.018)**
Joint borders	1.609* (0.855)	1.609* (0.855)		1.758** (0.743)	1.758** (0.743)	
ln *Distance*	-0.982** (0.387)	-0.982** (0.387)		-0.952** (0.370)	-0.952** (0.370)	
ln *Power ratio*	0.219 (0.168)	0.219 (0.168)		1.004*** (0.315)	-0.062 (0.176)	11.14 (0.0008)***
ln *Capabilities*$_I$	0.333 (0.219)	0.333 (0.219)		0.253 (0.205)	0.253 (0.205)	
Colonial history	2.019*** (0.657)	2.019*** (0.657)		2.440*** (0.832)	2.440*** (0.832)	
Cold War	1.164*** (0.425)	1.164*** (0.425)		1.110** (0.471)	1.110** (0.471)	
Constant	2.056 (3.748)	2.492 (3.731)		-1.569 (4.618)	2.342 (3.641)	
N	1721			1721		
Log pseudolikelihood	-98.685			-84.898		
Pseudo-R^2	0.390			0.475		
*: p < 0.10, **: p < 0.05, ***: p < 0.01 (robust standard errors, clustered by civil war).						

3) Both EGIP-EGIP and MEG-MEG dyads are hypothesised to cause interventions in favour of the government in civil war. There is little reason to expect that the effects of either dyad type should be substantially different, be it with regard to interventions in favour of government or rebels. The coefficient estimates of

EGIP-EGIP dyad and *MEG-MEG dyad* are therefore constrained to be equal with regard to their respective effects on *intervention in favour of government* and *intervention in favour of rebels*.

Based on a model with no constraints, I have also tested whether the coefficient estimates for any of the control variables are significantly different with regard to their respective effects on *intervention in favour of government* and *intervention in favour of rebels*. As demonstrated in Appendix 2, only the effect of *power ratio* varied significantly in relation to *intervention side*. Model 8 therefore lets the effect of *power ratio* vary freely between the two possible intervention outcomes, whereas all other control variables are constrained to be equal across *intervention side*. The relaxation of the constraints on *power ratio* was determined inductively because there were no clear theoretical expectations as regards its differential effects[6].

The results returned by model 8 are striking. Now that the dependent variable is disaggregated down to *intervention side*, all types of kin dyad that were associated with clear empirical expectations have strong effects. Potential interveners within an EGIP-MEG dyad are significantly more likely to intervene in favour of the rebels than potential interveners without ethnic ties. As indicated by the Wald test with chi-squared distribution, which returns a $p < 0.00005$, EGIP-MEG dyads are also significantly more likely to cause interventions in favour of the rebels than support for the government. In short, the EGIP-MEG dyad behaves exactly as expected. The MEG-EGIP dyad, however, has no significant effect on *intervention in favour of rebels*. This is no major surprise. While the MEG-EGIP dyad was defined by deduction, and a set of mechanisms leading to intervention were inferred, it was noted that the MEG-EGIP dyad was a less likely case of intervention than the remaining kin dyad types. The findings support this expectation.

As regards the EGIP-EGIP and MEG-MEG dyads, potential interveners within such dyads are significantly more likely to intervene on the government side in civil wars than non-kin third parties. At least as notable is the fact that the EGIP-EGIP and MEG-MEG dyads are significantly more likely to cause interventions on the government side than on the rebel side. Indeed, *EGIP-EGIP dyad* and *MEG-MEG dyad* have no significant effect on *intervention in favour of rebels*. The estimates provide strong support for the hypotheses inferred from the kin dyad typology. Ethnic groups in power are not only more likely to intervene in favour of kin in power involved in civil war. Countries also intervene in favour of foreign

[6] Appendix 2 presents the unconstrained multinomial logistic regression analysis, as well as the absolute and relative frequency distribution of *dyad type* on *intervention side*. It also discusses in more

governments with which they have no ethnic affinities, simply because both countries have marginalised ethnic groups with kinship ties.

The effect of *power ratio* in model 8 was not associated with any particular expectations, but should be commented on. The parameter estimates suggest that states intervene in favour of the rebels in civil wars irrespective of how powerful they are. The likelihood of intervention on the government side, however, increases with the relative power of the intervening state. The results are consistent with the pattern that great powers intervene to prop up governments whose survival serve the great powers' interests, but that are weakened by internal strife.

Summary

This paper set out from the premise that affective ties between ethnic groups across state boundaries can have material consequences for relations between states. In order to investigate possible effects of transnational ethnic affinities on the likelihood that states intervene in ethnic civil wars, I developed a typology of ethnic ties, derived by deduction from two basic postulates: the interstate dyad as the natural unit of analysis, and the distinction between ethnic groups in power (EGIP) and marginalised ethnic groups (MEG) (Cederman & Girardin *forthcoming*). Kin dyads – pairs of states that are home to ethnic groups with affinity for each other – can be of four types, determined by the power status of kin groups. All kin dyad types, I suggested, could be associated with a higher likelihood of intervention.

Empirical tests on dyadic data on ethnic civil wars and interventions in Europe, Asia, and North Africa 1947-1992 (Lemke & Regan 2004; Regan 1996) are strongly suggestive that transnational ethnic affinities cause interventions. This adds an important, but not wholly unanticipated (Regan 1998: 758) affective dimension to prior studies of the causes of interventions, including Regan (1998), Pickering (2002), Lemke & Regan (2004), and Aydin (2005). Furthermore, the kin dyad typology seems to provide a fruitful framework of analysis. All but one of the kin dyad types raise the likelihood of intervention. In order to see this however, it was necessary to sufficiently disaggregate the dependent variable. In a multinomial analysis of the categorical outcomes *no intervention*, *intervention in favour of government*, and *intervention in favour of rebels*, it became apparent that different types of kin dyads not only affect the likelihood of intervention, they also determine the conflict actor that intervening states support.

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depth the methodological motivation for the way in which the constraints on model 8 have been relaxed.

In sum, states whose ethnic group in power has affinity for a marginalised ethnic group at war with its government are most likely to intervene in favour of their ethnic kin, the rebels. If this was all, then studies with an analogous kin dyad setup would be sufficient to describe the effects of transnational ethnic affinities (Davis & Moore 1997; Saideman 2002). The effects of the remaining kin dyad types, however, suggest that the typology of kin dyads describes significant additional dimensions of transnational ethnic affinities: States whose ethnic group in power has affinity for an ethnic group in power that is involved in civil war are likely to intervene, and to do so in support of their kin in government. Also, states are likely to support foreign governments in civil war when the rebels have marginalised ethnic kin in the intervening state. The latter case illustrates that affective ties need not motivate intervening states directly. States may intervene preventatively, typically when transnational ethnic affinities give rise to fears of secession.

Appendix 1

All civil wars on which the statistical analyses are based, including conflict actors, their ethnic affiliation, and kin countries, are listed below.

Civil War Country[7]	Conflict Period[8]	Conflict ID[9]	Conflict Actor[10]	Ethnic Affiliation[11]	Kin Countries[12]
China	1947-1947	1180	China	Han Chinese	Mongolia, Philippines, Thailand
			Taiwanese insurgents	Taiwanese	-
Burma	1948-Ongoing	1230	Myanmar	Burman	-
			KNU	Karen	-
			God's army	Karen	-
		1250	Myanmar	Burman	-
			Arakan Insurgents	Arakanese	-
			ARIF	Arakanese	-
			RSO	Arakanese	-
		1260	Myanmar	Burman	-
			Various Insurgents	Mon	-
			NMSP	Mon	-
			BMA	Mon	-
		1340	Myanmar	Burman	-
			PNDF	Kachin	-
			KIO	Kachin	-
		1670	Myanmar	Burman	-
			SSA	Shan	-
			SSIA	Shan	-
			SSNPLO	Shan	-
			SSRA	Shan	-
			PSLO	Shan	-
			MTA	Shan	-
			SSA/s	Shan	-

[7] Countries with 'ethnic' or 'religious'civil wars (Regan 1996) as reproduced in Regan (2000: 153-158).
[8] Conflict periods according to Regan (1996) as reproduced in Regan (2000: 153-158). 'Ongoing refers to conflicts under way as of 1994' (Regan 2000: 153).
[9] Identification number for every conflict in the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Database (version 3) that corresponds to the civil wars in Regan's (1996) list (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Strand et al. 2005). The Conflict IDs are provided for ease of reference.
[10] Warring parties as listed in the main conflict table of the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Database, version 3 (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Strand et al. 2005). Country names denote the government side in civil wars.
[11] The ethnic identity of the conflict actor, given that it appears on Fearon's (2003) list of ethnic groups by country.
[12] Countries that are home to a group with the same ethnic identity as the conflict actor, according to (Fearon 2003).

Lebanon	1958-1958	1630	Lebanon	Maronite	-
			Independent Nasserite Movement/ Mourabitoun militia	Druze, Palestinian, Shi'i	Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria
Iraq	1961-1966	1740	Iraq	Sunni Arab	Algeria, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen
			KDP	Kurd	Iran, Syria, Turkey
Cyprus	1963-1964	**N/A**[13]	Cyprus	Greek	Albania, Greece
			Turkish	Turkish	Turkey
Spain	1968-Ongoing	2480	Spain	Castillan Speaking	Switzerland
			ETA	Basque	-
Jordan	1970-1970	**N/A**	Jordan	Transjordan Arab	Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen
			Palestinian	Palestinian	Israel, Lebanon
Pakistan	1971-1971	2160	Pakistan	Punjabi	India, Oman, Saudi Arabia
			Mukti Bahini: Liberation Force	Bengali	India, Oman
Lebanon	1975-1988	1630	Lebanon	Maronite	-
			Various organizations	Druze, Palestinian, Shi'i	Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria
Philippines	1972-Ongoing	2120	Philippines	Lowland Christian	-
			MNLF	Muslim Malay	Malaysia
			MILF	Muslim Malay	Malaysia
			ASG	Muslim Malay	Malaysia
Pakistan	1973-1977	2290	Pakistan	Punjabi	India, Oman, Saudi Arabia
			Baluchi separatists	Baluchi	Iran
Iraq	1974-1974	1740	Iraq	Sunni Arab	Algeria, Bahrain, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen
			KDP	Kurd	Iran, Syria, Turkey
Cyprus	1974-1974	2270	Cyprus	Greek	Albania, Greece
			Turkish	Turkish	Turkey
Indonesia	1975-Ongoing	2720	Indonesia	Javanese	-
			GAM	Aceh	-
Iran	1978-1979	1060	Iran	Persian	Bahrain, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates
			KDPI	Kurd	Iraq, Syria, Turkey
Sri Lanka	1982-Ongoing	2580	Sri Lanka	Sinhalese	-
			LTTE	Tamil	India
			TELO	Tamil	India
			PLOTE	Tamil	India
Iraq	1985-	1740	Iraq	Sunni Arab	Algeria, Bahrain, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya,

[13] 'Not applicable' under Conflict ID refers to conflicts that for reasons of coding procedure do not appear in the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Database, but are included in the Regan (1996) list.

	1993				Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen
			KDP	Kurd	Iran, Syria, Turkey
			PUK	Kurd	Iran, Syria, Turkey
			DPK	Kurd	Iran, Syria, Turkey
		1620	Iraq	Sunni Arab	Algeria, Bahrain, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen
			SCIRI	Shi'i	Iran, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia
India	1985-Ongoing	2570	India	Hindi Speaking	Burma, Oman, Singapore, UK
			Sikh insurgents	Punjabi/Sikh	Pakistan
Lebanon	1988-1990	1630	Lebanon	Maronite/Sunni Muslim	-
			Various organizations	Druze, Palestinian	Israel, Jordan, Syria
			Lebanese Army (Aoun)	Maronite	-
			Lebanese Forces	Maronite	-
Georgia	1991-1993	2990	Georgia	Georgian	USSR/Russia
			Republic of Abkhazia	Abkhazian	-
		3000	Georgia	Georgian	USSR/Russia
			Republic of South Ossetia	Ossetian (Southern)	-
Azerbaijan	1991-Ongoing	2950	Azerbaijan	Azeri	Armenia, Iran, USSR/Russia
			Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh	Armenian	Armenia, USSR/Russia
Yugoslavia	1991-1992	2910	Yugoslavia	Serb	Bosnia, Croatia, Hungary, Macedonia, Slovenia
			Republic of Slovenia	Slovene	Austria, Slovenia
		2920	Yugoslavia	Serb	Bosnia, Croatia, Hungary, Macedonia, Slovenia
			Republic of Croatia	Croat	Austria, Bosnia, Croatia, Slovenia
			Croatian irregulars	Croat	Austria, Bosnia, Croatia, Slovenia
Turkey	1984-Ongoing	2600	Turkey	Turkish	Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Germany, Macedonia, Switzerland
			PKK	Kurd	Iran, Iraq, Syria
Iraq	1991-Ongoing	1620	Iraq	Sunni Arab	Algeria, Bahrain, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen
			SCIRI	Shi'i	Iran, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia
Bosnia-Herzegovina	1992-Ongoing	2960	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Muslim	Greece, Yugoslavia
			Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina	Serb	Croatia, Hungary, Macedonia, Slovenia, Yugoslavia
			Serbian irregulars	Serb	Croatia, Hungary, Macedonia, Slovenia, Yugoslavia
		3040	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Muslim	Greece, Yugoslavia
			Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia	Croat	Austria, Croatia, Slovenia, Yugoslavia
		3050	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Muslim	Greece, Yugoslavia
			Croatian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina	Croat	Austria, Croatia, Slovenia, Yugoslavia
			Croatian irregulars	Croat	Austria, Croatia, Slovenia, Yugoslavia
Moldova	1992-Ongoing	3010	Moldova	Moldovans	USSR/Russia
			Dniestr Republic	Slavs	USSR/Russia
Afghanistan	1992-	2370	Afghanistan	Tajik	Tajikistan, USSR/Russia, Uzbekistan

	Ongoing		Afghanistan	Pashtun	Pakistan
			Military faction	**N/A**[14]	**-**
			Hezb-i-Islami	Pashtun	Pakistan
			Hezb-i-Wahdat-i-Islami	Hazara	**-**
			Jamiat-i-Islami	Tajik	Tajikistan, USSR/Russia, Uzbekistan
			Jumbish-i-Milli-ye Islami	Uzbek	Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, USSR/Russia, Uzbekistan
			Taleban	Pashtun	Pakistan
			UIFSA	Mainly Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek	Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, USSR/Russia, Uzbekistan

[14] The ethnic affiliation of the 'Military faction' is not applicable. 'Military faction' refers to the 15 April 1992 coup makers, and coups are not covered by Regan's (2000: 21) definition of civil war.

Appendix 2

The main challenge when fitting a multinomial logit model of *intervention side* is to avoid the problem of overdetermination, given that the data is sparse. The sample provides only 31 interventions for modelling. When they are distributed on two intervention sides and four kin dyad types plus ethnically neutral dyads, it is apparent that the individual cell counts will be very low. This is aptly illustrated by Table 7, which displays the frequency distribution of *kin dyad type* on *intervention side.* The table reports marginal totals of 12 interventions in favour of the government and 19 interventions in favour of the rebels. In all but three of the cells representing interventions the count is less than 5. Two of the cells have zero counts. These are 'sampling zeros', meaning that the true probability of observing an intervention in those cells is positive, and that a count probably would occur if the sample was sufficiently large (Agresti 1996: 191).

Table 7: Frequency distribution of *kin dyad type* on *intervention side*, absolute and relative frequencies (%).

Kin dyad type / *Intervention side*	EGIP-MEG dyad		MEG-EGIP dyad		EGIP-EGIP dyad		MEG-MEG dyad		Ethnically neutral dyad		N
Rebels	9	(64)	1	(2)	0	(0)	2	(5)	7	(0.4)	19
Government	0	(0)	1	(2)	2	(5)	6	(16)	3	(0.2)	12
No Intervention	5	(36)	45	(96)	35	(95)	30	(79)	1626	(99.4)	1741
N	14	(100)	47	(100)	37	(100)	38	(100)	1636	(100)	1772

Chi-squared (df = 8) = 690.312, p < 0.0005

The trouble with zero counts is that the true parameter estimates in such cases are infinite. Consider the EGIP-MEG dyad in Table 7. Given that EGIP-MEG dyads had zero interventions in favour of the government and 9 interventions in favour of the rebels, the sample probability of support for the rebels is infinitely greater than the sample probability of support for the government. When I estimated the unconstrained model in Table 8, the output displayed typical symptoms of an MLE iterative process forced to model sampling zeros. The number of iterations was very large, and the iterative process for fitting the model had trouble converging (Agresti 1996: 191). Also, as reported in Table 8, the unconstrained regression generated very large estimates and standard errors (Agresti 1996: 191). Consider again the EGIP-MEG dyad. Its estimated effect on *intervention in favour of rebels*, where one knows there is a zero count, is as great as -42.856, and the standard error is not defined.

In order to remedy the problem of sampling zeros, Agresti (1996: 192) suggests adding

Table 8: Multinomial logistic regression estimates, probability of intervention in civil wars in support of either government or rebels (unconstrained).

	Unconstrained model		
	G *Intervention in favour of government*	**R** *Intervention in favour of rebels*	Test for $\beta_{Gi} = \beta_{Ri}$
	$\hat{\beta}$ (SE)	$\hat{\beta}$ (SE)	χ^2 (sig.)
EGIP-MEG dyad	-42.856 (…)	3.318*** (0.891)	2688.11 (< 0.00005)***
MEG-EGIP dyad	0.840 (2.869)	-0.855 (0.923)	0.34 (0.563)
EGIP-EGIP dyad	5.094*** (1.857)	-35.721*** (0.985)	382.63 (< 0.00005)***
MEG-MEG dyad	3.772** (1.576)	-1.194 (1.139)	6.21 (0.013)**
Joint borders	0.931 (1.253)	2.441** (1.203)	0.71 (0.398)
ln *Distance*	-1.044*** (0.360)	-0.999* (0.588)	0.01 (0.942)
ln *Power ratio*	0.752*** (0.217)	0.001 (0.271)	4.78 (0.029)**
ln *Capabilities*$_i$	0.591 (0.359)	0.048 (0.357	1.01 (0.315)
Colonial history	1.587 (1.277)	3.184*** (0.763)	1.43 (0.233)
Cold War	0.320 (1.358)	1.891*** (0.572)	1.00 (0.317)
Constant	2.254 (3.116)	0.584 (6.243)	
N	1721		
Log pseudolikelihood	-81.404		
Pseudo-R^2	0.497		

*: p < 0.10, **: p < 0.05, ***: p < 0.01
(robust standard errors, clustered by civil war).

A small constant to empty cells, exclude the parts of the data containing empty cells, or merge empty cells with other parts of the data. This is in effect what I have done when defining constraints on the *kin dyad type* estimates. By constraining the effect of *EGIP-MEG dyad* on *intervention in favour of government* to be the negative of any effect on *intervention in favour of rebels* (see Table 5), I use the information in the positive cell count – 9 – in the {EGIP-MEG dyad, Rebels} cell to generate an intelligible estimate for the {EGIP-MEG dyad, Government} cell. By constraining the effects of *EGIP-EGIP dyad* and *MEG-MEG dyad* on *intervention in favour of rebels* to be the same – precisely as I do for their effects on *intervention in favour of government* – the constraint has the same effect as merging the {EGIP-EGIP dyad, Rebels} and {MEG-MEG dyad, Rebels} cells, as well as the {EGIP-EGIP dyad, Government} and {MEG-MEG dyad, Government} cells.

Aside from their methodological justification, the constraints on *kin dyad type* also have a theoretical rationale. By placing these particular constraints on *kin dyad type* I merely test the empirical expectation and no more: if transnational ethnic affinities cause interventions in EGIP-MEG dyads, they do so in favour of the rebels and not the government; ethnic ties may cause interventions within MEG-EGIP dyads, and if they do so, the support will be for the rebels. Both EGIP-EGIP and MEG-MEG dyads are most likely to see interventions in favour of the government, and there is little reason to expect that the effects of the two kin dyad types will be different from each other.

I had no particular expectations with regard to the control variables' effects on *intervention side*. The definition of constraints on the control variables was determined inductively based on the unconstrained model in Table 8. Only *power ratio* had significantly different estimates for β_G and β_R. I therefore let *power ratio* be estimated without constraints in Model 8, whereas all other control variables were constrained so that $\beta_{Gi} = \beta_{Ri}$.

The advantage of estimating a multinomial logit model under these particular constraints is that Model 8, in contrast to the unconstrained model, generates intelligible estimates in spite of the sparse data. Keeping the number of parameters at a minimum, Model 8 tests the hypotheses on *intervention side*, while remaining as parsimonious as possible. To the extent that the unconstrained model is interpretable, Model 8 does not depart from the substance of it. The hypotheses, as reported in the body of the paper, receive strong support.

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